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Introduction 
 
 
The EU’s New Energy and Climate Policy 
Framework for 2030 
Implications for the German Energy Transition 
Severin Fischer 
In October 2014, the leaders of the 28 EU Member States in the European Council agreed 
upon the outline of a common strategy for energy and climate policy to 2030. Until the 
very end of negotiations, the agreement was subject to Poland’s consent. The strategy 
includes quantified targets for the EU in three areas: emissions mitigation, renewable 
energy, and energy efficiency. At the same time, the European Council emphasized the 
role of national strategies in energy policy and made decisions on climate policy con-
ditional to intergovernmental agreement. In addition, the summit extended extensive 
financial transfers to and exemptions for Central and Eastern European Member States. 
This new EU framework poses challenges for Germany’s “Energiewende”, the objectives 
of which will find considerably less support in the structures of the EU’s energy and 
climate policy. 
 
Since the March 2007 decision of the Euro-
pean Council to establish an “integrated 
energy and climate policy”, the EU has 
become a relevant actor in this policy field. 
The focus at that time was on mandatory 
targets for emissions reduction and the 
expansion of renewable energies, as well 
as an indicative target for energy efficiency. 
Under the headline “20-20-20 by 2020”, a 
governance structure was created that was 
meant to initiate an EU-wide transforma-
tion of energy systems. An important point 
of reference for the EU decisions of 2007 
was the UN climate negotiations. 
The disappointing results of the Copen-
hagen summit in 2009, the impact of the 
economic and financial crisis, and the in-
creasing political emancipation of the new 
Central and Eastern European member 
states in EU politics, initiated a shift in 
priority towards competitiveness and sup-
ply security in the following years. The 
guiding rationale of low-carbon transfor-
mation gradually lost support. 
Against this background, the European 
Commission’s January 2014 proposals on 
the EU 2030 framework followed a prag-
matic approach taking new circumstances 
into account. An emission reduction target 
of 40 percent compared to 1990 was accom-
panied by a target for the share of renew-
able energy in the range of 27 percent for 
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2030. However, this time the renewables 
target was not supposed to be translated 
into national binding targets as in the 2020-
framework, but it would rather be binding 
at EU level. A new governance mechanism 
was proposed to guarantee that the national 
plans and the overall EU strategy correspond 
with one another. Only in July 2014 did the 
Commission propose a new energy efficien-
cy target in the range of 30 percent by 2030. 
The designated European Commission 
President Jean-Claude Juncker was explicit-
ly pushing for it. 
Polish domestic politics as driver of 
EU climate policy 
Since the decision on long-term goals for 
energy and climate policy is a fundamental 
question for the strategic development of 
the policy field, the 2030 framework debate 
was shifted to the level of the heads of state 
and government. It is important to note 
that the principle of consensus is the rule 
for decision-making in the European Coun-
cil (Article 15 TEU). This essentially means 
that there’s a unanimity requirement with 
a veto option for every single government. 
In 2007 and 2008, the 2020 framework and 
essential parts of its implementation were 
agreed upon under the conditions of this 
decision-making procedure. 
In the last couple of years, there has 
been a trend towards polarization on most 
energy and climate related topics in the 
EU with two camps facing off against one 
other. On the one hand, there’s the environ-
mentally progressive Member States with 
Germany and Denmark at the front. They 
back the continuation of the existing struc-
tures with ambitious targets for 2030. Ac-
cording to them, the EU should continue 
to set three binding targets to advance the 
transformation of the European energy 
system and guide the national energy strat-
egies. On the other hand, the Visegrád 
states (Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary), as well as Bulgaria and Romania, 
emphasize the national sovereignty on 
their energy mix (Article 194 TFEU). The 
role of the EU, they argue, should be limited 
to formulating a single greenhouse gas 
reduction target. This target in turn should 
be closely linked to the results of the UN 
climate negotiations and prevent over-
ambitious unilateral progress of the part of 
the EU. During the negotiations, the Polish 
government turned out to be the represen-
tative of the interests of the Central and 
Eastern European countries. The proposal 
to establish an “Energy Union” by the then-
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk made 
him the spokesmen of those forces in the 
negotiations who wanted to see more em-
phasis on security of supply in EU energy 
policies. 
Between the two camps were states such 
as the UK and the Netherlands; while advo-
cating for an ambitious climate target, they 
wanted to prevent the EU from expanding 
its powers in the fields of energy efficiency 
and initiating another round of binding 
targets for renewable energies. 
In view of the consensus rule in the Euro-
pean Council and the Polish government’s 
public announcement to be ready to prevent 
adverse decisions by using its veto, it became 
clear that an outcome of the summit would 
very much depend on Warsaw’s willingness 
to compromise. Thus in the end, it was 
Poland’s domestic politics that defined the 
scope for the EU 2030 framework’s nego-
tiation. 
For the Polish negotiators, however, 
three factors turned out to be crucial: First, 
a skeptical attitude in many parts of the 
Polish political class towards a Brussels-led 
change in the Polish energy system – an 
attitude shared by most of Poland’s unions, 
businesses and opposition parties. Second, 
the transfer of power from Donald Tusk to 
the new prime minister Ewa Kopacz played 
a role, mainly because her first steps in EU 
politics were watched by the media and the 
public in Poland with great attention. These 
two factors obstructed a compromise. A 
third factor, however, had a positive impact 
on the decision-making process around the 
energy and climate policy framework of the 
EU. If the negotiations had been inconclu-
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sive – and thus postponed – it would have 
landed them in the run-up to the Polish 
parliamentary elections in spring of 2015. 
A discussion on these issues during the 
election campaign would not have been 
in the Polish government’s interest. 
In her inaugural address, in-coming 
Prime Minister Kopacz made it clear that 
in Brussels she would step up for the inter-
ests of Polish electricity customers and 
prevent additional cost burden resulting 
from EU decisions. Polish government offi-
cials stressed that a Polish veto was likely if 
Western governments insisted on their po-
sitions. Thus it was clear to the negotiating 
parties that a result could only be achieved 
if the Polish government would be enabled 
to hail it as a political victory at home. 
Elements of the 2030 compromise 
Although the President of the European 
Council, Herman Van Rompuy, had been 
mandated to explore possible pathways 
for a compromise concerning the EU 
2030 framework already in spring 2014, 
by the beginning of the European Council 
meeting on 23 October 2014 only a few 
components of the package were in place. 
Despite Van Rompuy’s numerous bilateral 
meetings in European capitals, the Visegrád 
states led by Poland appeared just as un-
satisfied with the state of negotiations as 
other Member States who wanted to see 
their individual interests reflected in the 
conclusions. For example, a group includ-
ing Spain, Portugal and the Baltic states, 
wanted to link their electricity market 
more closely with the rest of Europe and 
asked for a binding interconnection target. 
But they met with strong opposition from 
France, which wanted to avoid an obliga-
tion to link the Iberian Peninsula to its 
electricity market. Therefore, not only the 
overarching target architecture, but also 
satisfying individual interests played a role 
in finding a compromise for the whole 
framework. 
In the end, three classical mechanisms 
of compromise-building in the European 
Council were responsible for the outcome: 
a high degree of ambiguity in the formula-
tion of the conclusions; the assurance of 
being able to change conclusions only 
through consensual intergovernmental de-
cisions; as well as extensive financial trans-
fers and exemptions for the blocking states. 
Ambiguity 
The drafting of compromise formulas in 
the European Council is characterized by 
the principle that all participants have to 
be able to save face at the end of the nego-
tiations. This can often be achieved only 
through a high degree of ambiguity in 
formulations that can allow for different 
interpretations. 
For a majority of the Northern and 
Western European Member States holding 
onto the target triad of emission reduction, 
expansion of renewable energies, and in-
creasing energy efficiency was of great im-
portance in terms of the reception of their 
respective national publics. In the Europe-
an Council conclusions, all three areas were 
treated with quantified targets (40 percent; 
27 percent; 27 percent) and an “at least” 
formula, which opens the floor for raising 
the target at a later date. For energy effi-
ciency, there was even the notice of a pos-
sible change to 30 percent after an assess-
ment in the coming years. At the same time, 
the conclusions also reflect the demands 
of the Central and Eastern European Mem-
ber States as well as the United Kingdom 
because neither the renewable energy 
target nor the energy efficiency formula 
will directly influence national decisions on 
energy mix and national energy strategies. 
Thus no direct implementation on member-
state level is foreseen. Also, the ambition 
of the two targets is at the lower end of the 
spectrum of negotiating positions – an-
other concession to the Central and Eastern 
European Member States. 
Similarly ambiguous is the text on the 
extent to which decisions can be revised. 
The conclusions include a review of the 
decisions of the European Council after 
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the climate conference in Paris in Decem-
ber 2015 (COP 21). In North-Western mem-
ber states, this clause was mostly inter-
preted as opening the way to increase the 
minimum target of a 40 percent reduction 
in greenhouse gases. In contrast, the Cen-
tral and Eastern Europeans underscored 
their belief that the emissions mitigations 
agenda will in the future be more closely 
linked to the successes of international cli-
mate negotiations. If these turn out to be 
unsatisfactory, the level of EU ambitions 
would be lowered. 
Therefore the conclusions of the Europe-
an Council will not end the debate on the 
energy policy framework for 2030. Instead, 
calls for renewed engagement on the dos-
sier that is expected in coming months, and 
particularly after the Paris Conference. This 
situation implies a high degree of uncer-
tainty about the actual commitments that 
the EU is willing to make. 
Intergovernmentalism 
The major differences in Member States’ 
perspectives with respect to structure and 
content of EU energy and climate policy 
after 2020 on the one hand, and govern-
ment concerns about a broad interpreta-
tion of the negotiation results by EU level 
institutions on the other hand, are the 
reasons why the compromise was secured 
under the condition of the need for inter-
governmental agreement to change certain 
provisions. The most telling evidence for 
the increase of unanimity conditions can 
be found in a formulation saying that all 
the elements of the policy framework will 
be reviewed by the European Council. Ex-
plicitly, the heads of state and government 
reserved the right to address the develop-
ment of the emissions trading scheme, 
decisions about national commitments to 
reduce emissions in the sectors not covered 
by the ETS, and commitments for the devel-
opment of interconnectors and energy 
efficiency to themselves. This way Poland 
(which wanted to reserve this caveat mainly 
for climate policy), France (interconnectors) 
and Great Britain (energy efficiency) could 
be assured that the central parameters 
of the agreed framework would not be ad-
justed without their consent. 
The European Council’s conclusions on 
the 2030 framework for energy and climate 
policy represent a new quality in an on-
going intergovernmentalisation process in 
EU politics. Although in the treaties such a 
transfer of competence is not foreseen and 
the European Council cannot formally act 
as a legislative body, the result is still that 
these decisions are politically binding. In 
the coming years, it will be crucial to see 
how the “ordinary legislative procedure” 
under Article 294 TFEU (with the Commis-
sion as an initiative organ and equal par-
ticipation of the European Parliament and 
the Council) competes with the political 
influence of the European Council in this 
area. However, it seems difficult to imagine 
in this context that in the future a majority 
decision is taken by the relevant Council 
formations without a prior decision of the 
heads of state and government. Already in 
recent years, many climate policy decisions 
had to be delayed because of the lack of 
consensus among Member States until an 
informal agreement was reached at the 
level of the heads of state and government. 
While there’s a trend towards intergov-
ernmental decision-making on climate 
policy, there’s also a stronger emphasis on 
the national planning of energy policies. 
Thus, not only those governments that are 
generally skeptical of new EU targets in the 
area of renewable energy and energy effi-
ciency policies wanted a confirmation in 
the conclusion text that they are allowed 
to determine their own energy mix on 
the basis of Article 194 TFEU, but also the 
environmentally more progressive states 
were granted a provision that their more 
ambitious national measures in the field of 
renewable energy and energy efficiency will 
not violate EU law. Given the growing diffi-
culties in the foreseeable future for the EU 
to take common decisions, all of this is like-
ly to result in a re-nationalization of energy 
policies in the EU. The design of the new 
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governance mechanism will have to 
address this challenge. 
Fragmentation 
Just as with the implementation of the 
2020 package, the consent of Central and 
Eastern European Member States was 
ensured only by conceding substantial 
financial compensation and exemptions 
to them. From 2021 onwards, emission 
certificates in the range of 12 percent of the 
total annual EU output will be distributed 
to Member States with a lower than average 
gross domestic product and can be sold by 
them. Member States are largely free to dis-
pose of the proceeds as they choose. In 
addition, the Central and Eastern European 
Member States may keep on allocating 40 
percent of their allowances in the electrici-
ty sector for free. 
A consequence of these extensive con-
cessions to the governments of Central and 
Eastern Europe is likely to be a regional 
fragmentation of the transformation to 
a low-carbon energy system in Europe. 
Through free allocation, the resulting costs 
of the EU emissions trading system for coal-
based power can be significantly reduced. 
Even if there were increasing costs, they 
could be compensated directly or indirectly 
through additional revenue from auction-
ing. These provisions in combination with 
the increased flexibility in the design of the 
energy mix will reduce the EU’s influence 
on the energy sector in Central and Eastern 
to a minimum. As a result, the EU is on 
track towards a transformation of two 
speeds: one for the east, one for the west. 
Implementing the new framework 
In the coming months, the Commission 
will be asked to give the political compro-
mises forged by the European Council a 
legal form, to submit legislative proposals, 
and to address outstanding issues. This will 
also be a first practical test for the new 
Commission of Jean-Claude Juncker. In the 
future, the Spanish Climate Action and 
Energy Commissioner, Miguel Arias Cañete, 
will be in charge of preparing the content 
for this process. Maroš Šefčovič, as vice presi-
dent, will be responsible for the coherence 
of the Energy Union program. 
Three dossiers will be at the centre of the 
implementation process on EU level – every 
single one of which has significant poten-
tial for conflict. 
Reform of the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme 
As a key instrument of EU climate policy, 
the emissions trading system (ETS) has 
been in need of reform for quite some time. 
Although it still fulfills its function as a 
volume control instrument to limit EU-
wide greenhouse gas emissions caused by 
industry and electricity generation, due to 
the oversupply of emission certificates, 
the system currently doesn’t send shortage 
signals to the market, which would spur 
investments in low-carbon technologies and 
energy efficiency. Still under EU Climate 
Action Commissioner Connie Hedegaard, 
therefore, a legislative proposal was pre-
sented that called for the introduction of a 
Market Stability Reserve (MSR) from 2021 on. 
In response to this proposal, the Euro-
pean Council agreed on introducing “an 
instrument to stabilise the market in line 
with the Commission proposal”. The cen-
tral point of conflict in the coming months 
will not be the question of “if” but rather 
of “when” the MSR will be set up. Germany, 
Britain and France want it up as early as 
2017, while Poland insists on the Commis-
sion proposal for 2021, having the backing 
of European Council conclusions. It will 
also depend on the date of the MSR’s intro-
duction whether the 900 million allow-
ances that were taken out of the market 
through the so-called “backloading mecha-
nism”, should be reintroduced into the 
market or flow directly into the MSR. 
The question of the introduction of the 
MSR and how to deal with the backloading 
certificates can also be seen in connection 
with the restructuring of the EU ETS from 
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2021 onwards, which was broadly outlined 
by the European Council. The Central and 
Eastern European governments are expected 
therefore to advocate a review of the entire 
package and try to prevent splitting it up 
into different individual packages. In this 
context, the consequences of the European 
Council’s engagement with detailed ques-
tions of EU climate policy will most likely 
be seen for the first time. 
Effort-sharing in sectors not covered 
by the emissions trading system 
About half of the EU-wide emissions are 
covered by the EU-wide harmonized ETS 
(electricity generation and industry). For 
the remaining sectors (mainly transport, 
buildings, agriculture), Member States have 
in the past agreed upon a differentiated 
effort-sharing based on individual national 
commitments. Between 2005 and 2020, 
emission reductions of 21 percent were 
directed through the ETS; 10 percent 
through national targets in the other sec-
tors. For 2030 this structure will be main-
tained, the targets however will be increased 
to a 43 percent reduction through emis-
sions trading and to 30 percent through 
national measures in the non-ETS sectors. 
The European Council has now formulated 
two criteria by which the national targets 
for reaching the 30 percent target shall be 
defined in the non-ETS sectors: First, the 
range of national commitments should be 
between 0 and 40 percent emission reduc-
tion compared to 2005. Second, it should 
be distributed equally according to eco-
nomic performance (using GDP per capita) 
as well as with respect to the difficulties 
of wealthier member states to find cost-
effective mitigation potentials. Given that 
each Member State will find arguments for 
reducing its own commitment, the distribu-
tion of the overall target is likely to create 
a major conflict in which the Central and 
Eastern European governments once again 
appeal for more solidarity from the North-
ern and Western European countries. Also 
on this point, the fact that the European 
Council is bound to the principle of una-
nimity will make it complicated to find a 
compromise in the coming months. 
Energy Union and governance mechanism 
While most of the framework conditions 
for the climate policy decisions were already 
formulated by the European Council, the 
Commission will have to be very creative 
in developing its proposals on the Energy 
Union and the governance mechanism. The 
leeway provided by the European Council 
for the structuring of both processes initial-
ly appears narrow since the Commission 
must leave the energy mix of the Member 
States untouched. The Energy Union will 
have to be built on the basis of existing in-
struments; ultimately, in terms of content, 
it will be a continuation of the internal 
energy market agenda with a likely exten-
sion of measures for security of gas supply. 
Thus the project’s impact could have mere-
ly a symbolic effect and act as a surrogate 
for an increasingly renationalized energy 
policy. 
The design of the governance structure 
will probably be structured along the lines 
of the well-known instrument of the Euro-
pean Semester. But even the definition of 
relevant indicators for evaluating national 
energy plans will, politically, be a highly 
sensitive undertaking. If it were really pos-
sible to reach an agreement, the question 
of the impact of the Commission’s recom-
mendations would be another open flank. 
As long as it remains mere recommenda-
tions, the process is unlikely to prove effec-
tive. 
The elaboration of the two projects and 
the subsequent political decision-making 
process will develop into a field in which 
the Commission and the European Parlia-
ment will wrestle with national govern-
ments over the impending loss of respon-
sibility for energy and climate issues. 
In the context of the three dossiers, 
there will not only be the question of how, 
but also in which sequence the relevant 
decisions are made. In particular, for the 
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climate policy-related aspects of the imple-
mentation package the December 2015 
climate summit in Paris will be an impor-
tant milestone. Depending on how they 
assess the probability of success in Paris, 
some Member State governments are likely 
to push for a fast implementation of the 
decisions of October 2014, while others will 
try to delay them. The design of the review 
clause in the conclusions, the unanimity 
requirement in climate policy, and the his-
torical experiences with the troubles around 
adjusting a EU climate targets leads one to 
assume that no actor will succeed in forcing 
a shift from the 40 percent target for the 
reduction of emissions 2030 in either direc-
tion. 
Implications for Germany’s 
Energy Transition 
The results of the negotiations on a new 
framework for the EU energy and climate 
policy clearly show increasing divergences 
between the goals and the speed of the 
transformation process in Germany and in 
the EU. While the German “Energiewende” 
as decided in 2011 was broadly consistent 
with the EU 2020 framework – only the 
nuclear-power phase-out decision was some-
how special to the German case – the flex-
ibility granted to Member States and the 
non-binding nature of the objectives in the 
2030 framework might lead to greater dif-
ferences in the coming years. In addition, 
the fact that the 80 to 95 percent emissions 
reduction target by 2050 was not men-
tioned in the European Council conclusions 
could mean that another important focal 
point turns out to be less important on EU 
level in the medium-term. 
Two different interpretations of this 
process of multi-level policy drifting apart 
seem to be plausible. In a positive inter-
pretation, one could view the increasing 
flexibility at the EU level as a signal for 
more freedom in implementing the Ger-
man “Energiewende”. The safeguarding of 
the national transformation path against 
interventions by the European Commis-
sion, like recently in the discussions about 
the German Renewable Energy Sources Act 
(EEG), can be booked as a success from this 
perspective. In a more negative interpreta-
tion, the re-nationalization of energy policies 
might constitute a problem for the German 
“Energiewende” because the compatible 
legal structure on EU level is being dis-
solved and the German government may 
need to handle more bilateral conflicts 
without being safeguarded by a supportive 
EU framework. 
Regardless of which of these two perspec-
tives is closer to reality, four themes will 
be central to the German “Energiewende” 
policy towards the EU in the coming years: 
First, the focus will be more on bilateral 
and multilateral dialogues with neighbour-
ing countries. Compared to a top-down con-
trol from Brussels, this seems to be a more 
promising way to politically deal with 
“Energiewende”-induced challenges on the 
markets (e.g., loop flows through neigh-
bouring countries) and to promote a com-
mon European transition path. 
Second, those policy areas with a remain-
ing high level of EU-wide harmonization, 
such as the emissions trading scheme and 
the electricity and gas market, should be 
strengthened in the future. Additional regu-
latory interventions by Germany in these 
areas pose the risk of accelerating the re-
nationalization process in energy and cli-
mate policies. Against this background, the 
debate about the national climate target as 
well as the introduction of a national capac-
ity market should be conducted taking into 
consideration their EU-wide impact and 
their consequences for EU policies. 
Third, it is necessary to develop new 
instruments at the EU level in order to in-
crease the attractiveness of the German 
“Energiewende” as a transformation model. 
In particular, a renewable energy policy 
rethink is required in order to put greater 
emphasis on EU-wide incentives instead 
of obligations on the part of the Member 
States. The latter proved to be too depend-
ent on political and economic conjunc-
tures. 
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Fourth, a reboot of EU energy policy will 
only succeed if Germany provides impetus 
for joint approaches beyond topics such as 
renewable energy and energy efficiency 
policy. Especially in the field of natural gas 
supply and grid development there could 
be direct added value on a European scale. 
If Germany appears only capable of speak-
ing about topics directly related to its “Ener-
giewende”, it might find itself missing 
relevant conversation partners quite soon. 
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